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Abstract: Aggressive tax planning efforts of highly profitable multinational companies (Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)) have recently become the subject of intense public 
debate. As a response, several international initiatives and parties have called for more 
transparency in financial reporting, especially by means of a country-specific reporting of 
certain tax information (Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR)). In our paper, we 
demonstrate that neither consolidated nor individual financial accounts seem to be an 
appropriate platform to provide such country-specific information and, therefore, that CbCR 
cannot be based on extended financial accounting standards. Moreover, we argue that even 
separate CbCR templates do not prevent multinationals from profit shifting, since their 
common tax minimization strategies are mainly based on the legal exploitation of gaps and 
loopholes in national and international tax law. In that regard, we show that expected costs for 
CbCR would exceed expected benefits and therefore contend that CbCR cannot be regarded 
as a convincing measure to combat international profit shifting. Instead, we argue that tax 
legislators should limit profit shifting by enforcing national and international tax rules and by 
closing gaps in tax law. In particular, we call for more tightened and standardized transfer 
pricing regulations to be adopted at an international level. 
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1. Introduction 
Tax planning efforts of highly profitable US multinationals such as Google, Apple or Amazon 
and their extremely low effective tax rates on their non-US profits have recently become the 
subject of intense public debate.1 The fact that these companies pay almost no corporate taxes 
in the foreign jurisdictions they operate in can most likely be attributed to activities aimed at 
shifting profits to tax havens. To this end, companies effectively exploit gaps and loopholes in 
international tax law, such that their endeavors do not in general classify as illegal. Yet, the 
acceptability of such activities from a social and ethical point of view is widely discussed; 
some call it ‘aggressive’ even though a clear distinction between ‘acceptable’ and 
‘aggressive’ tax planning is hard to define. 
Although there have been several attempts to quantify the scale of profit shifting,2 no accurate 
estimate of the exact amount of profits transferred to low tax jurisdictions exists to date. 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence clearly shows that profit shifting within multinationals does 
indeed take place regardless of the specific industry sector. In that respect, two channels have 
been identified: On the one hand, international tax rate differentials are found to be the major 
driver of profit shifting.3 On the other hand, debt financing as well as transfer pricing in 
general and licensing of Intellectual Property (IP) in particular are identified as the most 
important channels to relocate profits.4 Here, transfer pricing rather than debt financing turns 
out to be the dominant channel for profit shifting.5 
As a countermeasure to this issue, the OECD released a global action plan against Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) in July 2013.6 This action plan was adopted by the G-20 
leaders7 and is – in principle – supported by the European Commission.8 Arguing that a lack 
of transparency in financial reporting facilitates profit shifting9, the OECD action plan also 
includes – among other things – specific actions (Action 11-13) aimed at enhancing the 
                                                     
1 For a detailed discussion see C. Fuest et al. (2013), pp. 307-324. 
2 R. Murphy assumes that tax evasion and tax avoidance costs the EU member states 1 Trillion € a year, see R. 
Murphy (2012), p. 2; according to S. Bach, in Germany the yearly revenue loss due to profit shifting amounts to 
ca. 90 Billion €, see S. Bach (2013), p. 3ff.; J. H. Heckemeyer and C. Spengel, however, assume the revenue loss 
in Germany to be less than 10 Billion € and therefore much lower, see J. H. Heckemeyer & C. Spengel (2008), p. 
54; Oxfam calculates a revenue loss of $ 50 Billion for developing countries, see Oxfam (2000). 
3 See H. Grubert & J. Mutti (1991); J.R. Hines & E.M. Rice (1994); H.P. Huizinga & L. Laeven (2008); P. Egger 
et al. (2010); D. Dharmapala & N. Riedel (2013); C. Fuest et al. (2011); J.H. Heckemeyer & M. Overesch 
(2013). 
4 See M.A. Desai et al. (2004); T. Buettner at al. (2012) and K.A. Clausing (2003); M.A. Desai et al. (2006); M. 
Dischinger & N. Riedel (2011); T. Karkinsky & N. Riedel (2012); T. Lohse & N. Riedel (2013). 
5 See J.H. Heckemeyer & M. Overesch (2013), p. 30. 
6 OECD (2013a). 
7 See http://en.g20russia.ru/news/20131129/784497471.html. 
8 See European Commission (2013a), p. 4. 
9 See R. Murphy (2009), p. 4. 
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disclosure quality of tax-related information. Several other international initiatives and 
political parties have likewise recently called for more transparency in financial accounting, 
especially by means of a so-called Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR). This concept is 
based on the disclosure of key business information such as profits and taxes paid for each 
country that a multinational operates in. The proponents of CbCR claim that the disclosure of 
such information might build up pressure on companies to pay a fair amount of tax in relation 
to their economic activity in each country. Furthermore, this kind of disclosure could serve 
the purpose of enhancing the efficiency of the administration of tax collection and of 
detecting abusive tax arrangements. If CbCR proves to be successful in limiting profit shifting 
at all, the expected benefits should exceed the related costs.  
In our paper, we argue that CbCR and, thus, the related provisions of more detailed tax 
disclosure cannot be based on extended financial accounting standards – at least for the 
overwhelming number of countries in the world that exempt foreign income. Moreover, we 
argue that even special CbCR-requirement forms in addition to financial accounts do not 
prevent multinationals from profit shifting and that costs for CbCR exceed expected benefits. 
We therefore contend that first of all tax legislators should take action to restrict profit shifting 
by limiting loopholes in the allocation of multinationals’ profits. Here, the area of transfer 
pricing seems to be promising. In essence, we argue for more standardized transfer pricing 
regulations which should be adopted at the international level. 
Our paper is organized as follows: First, we provide an overview of the existing initiatives 
regarding CbCR (Section 2). Second, we discuss to what extent the required information 
could be integrated into the existing financial reporting framework. In addition, we discuss 
expected costs and benefits linked to country-specific reporting (Section 3). Third, we derive 
potential alternatives for reform (Section 4). Finally, we conclude (Section 5). 
2. Existing provisions of tax disclosure and trends for Country-by-Country Reporting 
To date, there have been no extensive provisions prescribing a CbCR for all countries and 
industry sectors. However, numerous regulations in national and international tax law already 
require the disclosure of certain specific tax information. These regulations can be divided 
into CbCR provisions for specific industries, the public disclosure of tax information and 
internal documentation requirements such as for transfer prices (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Tax disclosure: Existing provisions and trends 
Certain regulations requiring country-specific information have already been put in place, 
albeit only for specific sectors, namely the extractive (production of oil, natural gas and 
minerals) and financial sectors respectively. It should be noted that these specific CbCR-
requirements are mainly outside the scope of financial reporting. 
The most comprehensive rulings concern the extractive industry, not because of tax reasons, 
but rather due to a high risk of corruption in this sector. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI),10 for instance, is an international standard which countries 
may sign up to voluntarily, basically aimed at reconciling company and government 
payments. Participating countries have the duty to produce a public report, but are, however, 
entitled to decide on the exact form and scope of disclosure. In contrast, according to the 
Dodd-Frank Act, listed companies in the US operating in the extractive sector are obliged to 
publish payments made to governments on a country-by-country basis and in a standardized 
way.11 Similarly, the EU Accounting and Transparency Directive implemented in July 2013 
requires EU (listed and large non-listed) companies in the extractive and forestry sectors to 
                                                     
10 http://eiti.org. 
11 See Congress of the United States of America (2010), Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. Similar regulations apply for companies listed at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX). 
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disclose payments to national governments as part of their annual financial statements.12 Like 
the other two initiatives, it does not, however, intend the declaration of country-specific profit 
figures and tax payments. 
In July 2013, the EU Capital Requirements Directive IV (“CRD IV”)13 was adopted. This is 
the first initiative governing country-by-country disclosure for financial institutions in the EU. 
Primarily aimed at the enhancement of transparency, this directive stipulates that all 
concerned companies publicly disclose the names of their operations, turnover and the 
number of employees in every relevant country, effective from 2014. Most important, 
however, are country-specific data on profits/losses and tax payments, which will 
preliminarily have to be confidentially reported to the Commission only. The Commission 
plans to assess the potentially negative consequences of publishing this information and then 
to decide whether to keep them confidential or make them publicly accessible from 2015 
onwards. 
In general, most local GAAPs as well as the IFRS stipulate the disclosure of certain 
information regarding current and future tax payments of multinational companies in the 
financial statements (e.g. IAS 12). In consolidated financial accounts, however, this 
information is usually only available at the parent level or per segment (e.g. IFRS 8), but not 
necessarily at a regional or country-level. Tax information in individual accounts, on the other 
hand, can hardly be interpreted and compared due to the heterogeneity of local GAAPs. Tax 
returns containing exact tax payments to local fiscal authorities are not accessible in the 
majority of countries.14 Moreover, some GAAPs require the additional disclosure of very 
specific tax information. FIN 48, “Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes” (released in 
2006), for instance, stipulates the publication of income tax risks of businesses adhering to 
US-GAAP. Thereby, companies have to assess the sustainability of their uncertain tax 
benefits (more-likely-than-not criterion) and establish tax reserves for tax positions they find 
not to meet the more-likely-than-not criterion.15 
Following the OECD recommendation16 on the pricing of intra-group transactions, many 
countries have focused on the transfer pricing regulations in their national tax codes in recent 
years. The scope of the provisions, however, still ranges from the simple requirement of the 
                                                     
12 Directive 2013/34/EC. 
13 Directive 2013/36/EU. 
14 Only some countries, e.g. Finland, Sweden and Norway, require individual and/or tax returns to be publicly 
disclosed. In Japan, public disclosure of individual and corporate tax return data was mandatory from 1950-2004 
(see M. Hasegawa et al. (2013), p. 572). 
15 For an overview over the FIN 48 regulations, see J. Blouin et al. (2007). 
16 OECD (2010). 
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application of the arm’s length principle to detailed documentation requirements justifying 
intra-group prices and profit allocation to tax authorities (confidentially).17  
In summary, the description of the status quo of tax disclosure provisions reveals that a 
comprehensive country-by-country reporting has not been implemented so far. Nevertheless, 
the public debate indicates a strong demand for more transparency in financial reporting. In 
this regard, the OECD action plan on BEPS reflects this trend towards stricter and more 
extensive disclosure requirements for companies in all industry sectors. In particular, actions 
11 to 13 of the plan address the collection of firm-level data on BEPS and the disclosure of 
aggressive tax planning arrangements that companies may make use of. Moreover, it calls for 
the disclosure of country-specific information. The “Memorandum on transfer pricing 
documentation and CbCR”, released in October 2013, specifies this concern by stipulating 
that CbCR should become a compulsory part of the transfer pricing documentation.18 
Taxpayers would be obliged to report income, taxes paid and certain indicators of economic 
activity to governmental authorities, i.e. CbCR information would not be part of financial 
accounts and thus not be made public. The OECD has further announced to push this subject 
forward by developing a concrete CbCR template by the end of 2014. Likewise, the European 
Commission has also signaled its support for a comprehensive CbCR framework.19  
In addition, several networks and initiatives such as the “Task Force on Financial Integrity 
and Economic Development”20 have extensively worked on a concept for country-specific 
reporting for all multinationals.21 Some political parties have also brought forward requests 
for such disclosure regulations. The Social Democratic Party of Germany and the German 
Greens, for instance, have addressed this matter in their national election campaign of 2013. 
In their common petition, they call for the publication of country-specific information on tax 
payments, profits, revenues, employees and total assets as part of local German GAAP.22 
As an interim result, it can be concluded that CbCR already exists in particular cases, for 
example, in some industries, yet not necessarily within the framework of financial accounting. 
Against the background of the BEPS discussion, a comprehensive CbCR as a general standard 
for large multinational companies is being called for by various parties and international 
institutions to enhance transparency. The proposals, however, vary with respect to the kind of 
                                                     
17 See T. Lohse et al. (2012); T. Lohse & N.Riedel (2013), p. 2. 
18 See OECD (2013b). 
19 See European Commission (2013b). 
20 See R. Murphy (2009). 
21 See M. Devereux (2011), p. 24ff. 
22 See Deutscher Bundestag (2013), p. 2.  
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disclosure. While some argue in favor of CbCR as a mandatory part of public financial 
reporting, others prefer reporting only to tax authorities within the framework of transfer 
pricing documentation. In the following, it will be discussed which option seems to be more 
promising. 
3. Comprehensive Country-by-Country Reporting (for all industry sectors) 
3.1. Required information 
The first question regarding the actual design of a comprehensive CbCR framework for all 
industry sectors concerns the required information for the identification of potentially tax-
aggressive activities. Most importantly, data on profits and related tax payments in the 
relevant countries for each entity should be provided to evaluate the appropriateness of the 
amounts paid. In addition, several further disclosures would serve the purpose of examining a 
company’s real economic activity in a country. As an example, the items listed in Figure 2 
should be disclosed for each country the multinational operates in within the framework of a 
CbCR:23  
 
Figure 2: Example for information requirements under CbCR 
Essentially, sales, purchases and financing costs including royalties and other (overhead) costs 
such as marketing and R&D expenses should be split up between intra-group and third party 
transactions to shed light on profit shifting activities. In particular, intra-group transactions 
should be reported on a per-country basis. Moreover, the tax charge would have to be divided 
                                                     
23 See R. Murphy (2009), p. 8, and, in particular, OECD (2013b). 
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into current (i.e. cash and accrued) and deferred taxes since governments are most interested 
in cash taxes.  
3.2. Mechanisms for providing tax disclosure 
3.2.1. Possible starting points 
The second question relates to the specific mechanisms for providing these country-specific 
data. In particular, the question of which framework could deliver this information arises.24 
As a starting point, one could think of consolidated financial accounts, and thus the IFRS, as a 
platform for CbCR. Alternatively, individual financial statements could be used. A third 
alternative would be a tax-specific CbCR template independent from financial statements. 
The following examines the three alternatives successively. The evaluation is based on a 
simple example for intra-group profit shifting of multinationals incorporating an IP-Holding 
company located in a low-tax jurisdiction (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Example for international profit shifting  
The example assumes a parent company (Parent-Co) in Country P with a 100% holding in a 
subsidiary in high-tax jurisdiction S and an IP-Holding in low-tax jurisdiction IP, where the 
group’s IP (e.g. a patent) is located. The IP is licensed to the subsidiary in Country S in 
exchange for a royalty payment reducing the subsidiary’s profit. Foreign profits and dividends 
are exempt from tax in Country P. Figure 3 displays separately the amount of sales, costs and 
                                                     
24 See M. Devereux (2011), p. 39ff.; C. Fuest et al. (2013), p. 322; OECD (2013b). 
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pre-tax profits as well as intra-group transactions and the nominal tax rates for each company 
and country – P, S and IP. If total profits of the group (€ 2.2 Billion) were taxed at the level of 
Parent-Co, the tax charge would amount to € 0.66 Billion (= 2.2*0.3). In our example, 
however, the tax charge is reduced by € 0.48 Billion to € 0.18 Billion. Above all, from the 
total sales of € 2 Billion from the subsidiary in Country S, € 1.9 Billion are shifted to IP-
Holding, yielding a tax saving of € 0.475 Billion (= (0.3-0.05)*1.9). Considering additionally 
the tax reduction in Country S, the total tax saving amounts to € 0.48 Billion (= 0.1*(0.3-0.25) 
+ 0.475).  
3.2.2. Consolidated financial statements 
According to prevailing accounting standards (e.g. IFRS), consolidated financial statements 
disclose tax information in the profit and loss statement, the tax reconciliation and the 
segmental reporting. Building on consolidated accounts as a starting point for CbCR, 
however, has several drawbacks and does not seem to be feasible.  
Most importantly, consolidated financial statements are supposed to provide decision useful 
information about a group of companies as a single economic entity. Therefore, intra-group 
transactions are consolidated and, thus, do not affect the overall profit. As the example shows, 
profit shifting activities by means of intra-group transactions are not visible in consolidated 
financial statements. This is due to the netting out of profits and expenses within the group (in 
our example: royalty income of IP-Holding and payments of Subsidiary of € 1.9 billion) and 
the aggregation of total tax payments (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Intra-group profit shifting and consolidated financial accounts 
The profit & loss statement therefore only reveals sales (€ 3 billion), costs (€ 0.8 billion) and 
profits (€ 2.2 billion) in aggregated form. The intra-group licensing arrangement is 
disregarded.  
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Tax reconciliations only disclose the total tax reduction (i.e. the low ETR) due to operations 
in low tax jurisdictions (€ 0.48 billion), but do not specify the underlying profit shifting 
mechanisms or countries involved, as required by CbCR (in our example the interposition of 
the IP-Holding). Moreover, accounting standards follow a forward-looking approach, while 
CbCR is strictly backward-looking. This is relevant if deferred taxes are required to be 
reported. This part of the total tax charge is based on reliable expectations about the future 
and is, in principle, not relevant for CbCR. Accounting for deferred taxes on international 
operations is closely linked to the taxation of foreign income in the country where the 
multinational is headquartered. If the exemption method applies to foreign profits – this holds 
for the majority of countries in the world – a lower foreign tax becomes definite and therefore 
does not trigger a deferred tax expense.25 The situation is different, for example, in the United 
States (US). Here, foreign profits are subject to US tax and a credit is granted for the 
underlying foreign tax. Following the concept of deferred taxes, a lower foreign tax should 
not be treated as a permanent difference (as under the exemption method). It should rather be 
treated as a temporary difference and should therefore increase deferred taxes if profits are 
retained in low-tax jurisdictions. According to the so-called indefinite-reversal exception 
under US financial reporting rules, however, a corporation that defers the repatriation of 
foreign profits might defer the repatriation tax charge until profits are distributed to the US.26 
Empirical evidence suggests that the indefinite-reversal exception incentivizes the 
accumulation and retention of foreign profits abroad.27 Therefore, it is argued that a reform of 
US financial reporting rules could limit profit-shifting activities into tax havens. However, 
this does not hold at all if foreign profits are exempt from tax. 
Segmental reporting as another part of consolidated accounts does not deliver country-specific 
information either. According to the management approach (e.g. IFRS 8), data is disclosed on 
a business-unit level, yet not necessarily on a geographic or even per-country basis. In the 
context of our example, it could be possible that Parent-Co, Subsidiary and IP-Holding all 
belong to the same business unit and therefore no more detailed information would be 
provided. 
Hence, in order to reveal single intra-group transactions, it would be necessary to examine 
“de-consolidated” data. This, however, does not serve the purposes of reporting on group 
                                                     
25 Please note that our example assumes that foreign profits are exempt from tax in the parent`s jurisdiction. To 
our knowledge, only 8 out of 34 OECD member states apply the credit method, among them the US, see G. 
Kofler (2012), p. 83. 
26 See R. Clemons et al. (2013), p. 427. 
27 See J. Blouin et al. (2012). 
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level. Furthermore, it is questionable to what extent the target group of CbCR and financial 
statements actually correspond with each other.28 In addition, financial statements contain 
data based on future prospects of the company, while CbCR is intended to detect profit 
shifting behavior in past periods. Therefore, it can be concluded that consolidated financial 
statements do not seem to be the appropriate platform to deliver CbCR information. 
3.2.3. Individual financial statements 
Alternatively, one could think of individual financial statements as a starting point for CbCR 
information. Although individual financial statements, as opposed to consolidated financial 
statements, contain unconsolidated data on single company level, such an approach would 
have several drawbacks as well.29 First, the exact source and direction of intra-group 
transactions do not become evident on a per-country basis. Second, individual financial 
statements are in general prepared according to local GAAPs and might be quite 
heterogeneous and thus not comparable across countries. Third and most importantly, 
financial accounts neither reflect taxable income nor do they provide reliable estimates for the 
true value of assets. As a general rule, book-tax-differences arise in most countries due to 
country-specific tax laws; the exemption from tax of certain types of income - in particular 
inter-company dividends and foreign source income - and non-deductible expenses are the 
most prominent examples. In addition, other reasons relating to different interrelations 
between financial accounting and national tax laws (e.g. different tax accounting standards 
and provisions to allocate income and expenses) are decisive for financial profits not 
necessarily to reflect taxable income.30 Regarding the reflection of the value of assets, in 
particular intangibles, they might not be recorded at all, if self-developed, or only at historical 
costs. According to our example in Figure 4, it might be indeed misleading if IP-Holding had 
created the IP on its own and would display no or a very low value for intangibles in its 
financial accounts on the one hand and reports high taxable profits from royalties on the other 
hand.  
3.2.4. Interim conclusion: CbCR as a tax-specific template 
To conclude, in terms of current structure and purpose and due to country-specific tax laws, 
neither consolidated nor individual financial statements can serve as a suitable basis for 
CbCR. Therefore, it seems to be most reasonable to disclose this information in a separate 
                                                     
28 It could be argued that consolidated accounts are primarily relevant for investors and capital markets, whereas 
CbCR first and foremost benefits tax authorities and critical public parties. 
29 See, e.g., OECD (2013b). 
30 See D. Endres et al. (2007); W. Schön (2005); C. Spengel & Y. Zöllkau (2012). 
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tax-specific template, if at all. These findings are in line with the ongoing discussion on 
CbCR at the level of the OECD, which aims towards the disclosure of a CbC report as part of 
the transfer pricing documentation (see Section 2).  
In that case, however, it would be necessary to define a standardized and harmonized set-up 
with respect to scope (eligible companies), regulations and definitions (determination of 
income and valuation of assets) as well as a mandatory scheme to provide the relevant 
information. Other important aspects include the extent to which the disclosures should be 
mandatory or voluntary and whether they should be held confidential or made accessible to 
the public.31 Finally, it has to be decided if and by whom the CbC report should be audited.  
3.3. Expected costs and benefits 
As a prerequisite for CbCR to be meaningful at all, the expected benefits of any additional 
disclosure of tax information have to outweigh the expected costs. Yet, to date, little is known 
about the exact costs and benefits related to CbCR. 
3.3.1. Costs 
CbCR is suspected to be associated with several direct costs for disclosure.32 In addition, 
implicit costs occur; the volume of such implicit costs is likely to exceed that of direct costs 
for disclosure and depends on whether the disclosure is made public or only available to tax 
authorities. 
First of all, direct costs for disclosure would initially arise for adjusting existing systems and 
processes to the requirements of CbCR. While some33 argue that many existing financial 
reporting systems are already technically able to deliver country-related data, the scope of 
initial costs is not exactly predictable and may depend on other factors such as the complexity 
of the group structure. Direct costs for reporting would also be incurred on a regular basis and 
would depend, for example, on the scope of disclosure requirements, (potential) materiality 
thresholds and the need for auditing the report. According to recent articles in professional 
journals,34 the necessary information already exists and can be taken from financial and 
internal accounts as well as from tax declarations. CbCR could nevertheless become 
particularly expensive, if it introduced a completely new set of reporting provisions 
                                                     
31 See M. Devereux (2011), p. 31ff. 
32 The following discussion of possible costs of a CbCR is adapted from M. Devereux (2011), pp. 34-38. 
33 See R. Murphy (2009), p. 21. 
34 See H.K. Kroppen (2013); T. Rödder & R. Pinkernell (2013); C. Heber (2013). 
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independent from financial and tax accounting rules and if companies considered it necessary 
to justify and extensively explain their reports to the public.35  
Implicit costs of CbCR would primarily stem from disclosing the information to the public. 
Here, CbCR could be associated with considerable competitive disadvantages. Publishing 
commercially sensitive information would be particularly problematic in case country-specific 
reporting were not mandatory for all companies (e.g. not in all countries/regions or only for 
companies of a specific size). Moreover, disclosing data on tax payments potentially violates 
tax secrecy, which constitutes a guiding principle of tax law in most countries in the world.  
In addition, international tax law is highly complex and public interested parties without 
profound knowledge of the subject might be unable to appropriately process and interpret the 
information disclosed. For instance, low (or zero) tax payments do not necessarily point to tax 
aggressiveness or at least do not necessarily result from illegal undertakings. Nevertheless, 
wrong accusations against companies could be made. 
Another potential implicit cost of CbCR is associated with the danger of double taxation even 
in the absence of public disclosure: Knowing all tax payments on a country-by-country basis 
could make tax authorities raise their own claims towards companies.36  
3.3.2. Benefits 
In contrast to the expected costs, the expected benefits from additional disclosure of tax 
information are less clear. Proponents of CbCR believe that companies would be urged to pay 
a fair amount of tax in relation to their economic activity in each country. In addition, CbCR 
could enhance the administrative efficiency of tax collection and detect abusive tax 
arrangements. Moreover, additional disclosure of tax information would be beneficial from 
the point of view of capital markets. Finally, customers could put pressure on multinationals 
to increase tax payments in the different consumer markets. The following discussion reveals 
a missing theoretical foundation of these arguments and illustrates that CbCR information 
should not be made public, but only be transferred to tax authorities confidentially, if at all.  
A major argument in favor of CbCR is that companies would be urged to pay taxes at an 
amount that truly reflects the companies’ economic activity and its utilization of public 
infrastructure in a particular country.37 Yet, this reasoning is merely speculative, in particular 
since the common tax minimization strategies employed by multinationals are mostly based 
                                                     
35 See M. Devereux (2011), p. 32ff. 
36 See I. Schlie & C. Malke (2013), p. 2469. 
37 See Deutscher Bundestag (2013) p.1; M. Devereux (2011), p. 7. 
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on the exploitation of loopholes in domestic and international tax laws and therefore in itself 
are not illegal. Moreover, this argument cannot be based on theoretical foundations, since it is 
virtually impossible to properly allocate profits and costs to single affiliates of a group by 
means of transfer prices: By setting up an integrated group of companies, coordination of 
transactions via markets is abandoned in favour of coordination using intra-organisational 
hierarchies. The aim is to generate economies of integration, for example by means of lower 
transaction costs, improvement of information flow or managerial efficiency. As a result, the 
profits of an integrated group of companies are higher than the aggregate profits earned by its 
separate entities. Since the excess profits accrue at group level, it is theoretically impossible to 
determine the source of these profits as they cannot be attributed to specific and, above all, 
individual transactions either.38  
In addition, it is also questionable to what extent CbCR actually entails additional insights and 
benefits for tax authorities. Tax authorities can be assumed to be already familiar with the 
common (legal) channels and arrangements used for profit shifting, ever since the most 
prominent examples have been made available to the public.39 CbCR, therefore, might only 
provide hints as regards the question of which companies should be audited or examined with 
increased scrutiny. This might be relevant for inbound investments in particular. Then, 
however, it could be argued that it is not necessary to make country-by-country disclosures 
publicly accessible, i.e. it would be sufficient to make the information available to fiscal 
authorities only. This is also in line with the OECD’s proposal to integrate CbCR into the 
transfer pricing documentation framework. 
Proponents of CbCR moreover claim that the enlarged information set (available to the 
public) would be beneficial from a capital market point of view. For instance, knowing which 
countries a multinational operates in could potentially enable investors to better assess the 
companies’ geo-political risk and the sustainability of its tax charge.40 However, some 
empirical evidence suggests that capital market participants already face an information 
overload and do not actually consider the full information set available.41  
Finally and most importantly, it seems unlikely that CbCR will reduce tax minimization 
grounded on the utilization of beneficial tax regimes and constructional flaws in international 
                                                     
38 See C.E. Mclure (1984), p. 94ff.; R. Avi-Yonah & I. Benshalom (2011), p. 379; O.H. Jacobs et al. (2011), 
p. 661; W. Schön (2010), p. 233ff.; H.J. Ault (2013), p.1200-1201. 
39 See R. Pinkernell (2012), p. 369ff.; E. Kleinbard (2011), p. 707ff. 
40 See R. Murphy (2009), p. 14. Investors could for instance see whether the tax charge largely depends on 
operations located in tax haven countries.  
41 See D. Lenter et al. (2003), p. 823ff.; J.S. Raedy et al. (2011), p. 3. 
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tax law. Rather, public pressure resulting from CbCR would be expected in case of illegal 
endeavors, which, however, are mostly not the reason for the unusually low effective tax rates 
of multinationals currently observed. 
Moreover, empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive with regard to the relationship 
between a forced increase in the information to be disclosed by companies and tax aggressive 
behavior. Hasegawa et al.42, for instance, assess the tax reform in Japan in 2004 which 
constituted the abolishment of mandatory disclosure of individual and corporate tax returns. 
They find that companies do not generally report higher profits once tax returns become 
confidential again. A change in behavior with respect to tax planning activities can actually 
only be observed for non-listed companies. Therefore their findings are inconclusive with 
regard to the hypothesis that enforced disclosure reduces tax aggressiveness. Their findings 
further suggest that non-universal (unilateral) disclosure provisions would even trigger tax 
avoidance behavior. Furthermore, they show that if there is a threshold for disclosure, many 
taxpayers would under-report so as to avoid disclosure. Mixed empirical evidence also exists 
with regard to the FIN 48 implementation.43 Gupta et al.44 find that increased tax disclosure 
under FIN 48 reduced firm tax aggressiveness, at least at the state level.45 Similarly, 
Balakrishnan et al.46 report that aggressive tax planning decreases corporate transparency, but 
also increases the volume of tax-related disclosure. Yet, Blouin et al. observe that public firms 
appear to have taken actions to avoid mandated disclosure under FIN 48.47 As a result, there 
is no clear empirical evidence reflecting that a change in disclosure provisions affects firm’s 
tax aggressiveness. If at all, this applies to non-listed companies.  
Lastly, since there is no clear empirical evidence showing that companies publicly accused of 
having engaged in aggressive tax planning suffer from damage to their reputation yet, it 
remains uncertain whether CbCR would actually impact customers’ purchase decision at all.  
3.3.3. Interim conclusion 
To sum up, it can be concluded that expected benefits of CbCR lack a theoretical foundation 
and, according to empirical evidence, do not seem to outweigh the associated costs. Instead, it 
                                                     
42 M. Hasegawa et al. (2013). 
43 For more details on FIN 48, see Section 2 above. 
44 S. Gupta et al. (2013). 
45 Similar results have been obtained by Hope et al. (2013) for a different setting. They show that tax avoidance 
behavior has increased after mandatory geographic earnings disclosure (SFAS No. 131) were abolished. 
46 K. Balakrishnan et al. (2012). 
47 J. Blouin et al. (2010). 
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appears to be reasonable to combat tax aggressiveness by different means. It is, therefore, up 
to legislators to remove unintended gaps and loopholes in the tax laws. 
4. Alternatives 
As discussed above, legal tax planning activities can hardly be combated by increasing 
transparency in financial reporting or by CbCR. Rather, it might be more effective to limit the 
leeway companies have with respect to constructing tax minimizing group structures. 
Empirical evidence reveals intra-group financing and transfer pricing as the most prominent 
channels for multinationals’ profit shifting. In a recent meta-analysis, Heckemeyer and 
Overesch show that transfer pricing is by far the most dominant profit shifting channel. While 
transfer pricing explains 72% of the total share of shifted profits, the share of intra-group 
financing amounts to 28% only.48 Further empirical evidence shows that enforcing tax rules 
does indeed reduce tax aggressive behaviour of multinational companies.  
One example for the tightening of tax rules has been the enforcement of transfer pricing rules 
in the last years. Lohse, Spengel and Riedel49 aim to generate a measure for the stringency 
and impact of transfer pricing rules showing that the regulations have become stricter over 
time. In that regard, Lohse and Riedel50 use these insights to demonstrate that such transfer 
pricing regulations significantly reduce profit shifting activities by up to 50% (measured by 
the sensitivity of corporate pre-tax profits to changes in the corporate income tax rate). In 
particular, penalties exert an additional limiting effect on profit shifting behavior. 
Furthermore, they argue that higher administrative costs arising from additional 
documentation requirements can be justified in the light of anticipated benefits. In addition, 
Luckhaupt et al. point out the importance of a standardized set of transfer pricing rules in 
order to decrease complexity and to actually reduce the leeway for profit shifting.51 
With regard to intra-group financing, studies have revealed the effectiveness of thin 
capitalization rules. Buettner et al.52 find that thin-capitalization rules effectively reduce 
multinationals’ incentive to make use of internal loans for international tax planning. Blouin 
et al.53 obtain similar results concerning the effectiveness of thin capitalization rules with 
                                                     
48 See J.H. Heckemeyer & M. Overesch (2013), pp. 23-26. 
49 T. Lohse et al. (2012). 
50 T. Lohse & N. Riedel (2013). 
51 See H. Luckhaupt et al. (2012). In particular they propose an apportionment method for those profits that 
cannot be allocated by transfer pricing. 
52 T. Buettner et al. (2012). 
53 J. Blouin et al. (2013). 
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respect to their impact on the capital structure of multinational firms (reduction of internal 
debt).  
A promising avenue might therefore be to close gaps and loopholes and to reduce leeway in 
domestic and international tax laws. However, in that case it would be important to ensure 
that tightened regulations do not lead to double taxation, i.e. these regulations would have to 
be universally accepted by all countries. Here, a standardization of transfer pricing regulations 
might be more efficient in terms of limiting profit shifting and is more in line with the goals 
of avoiding double- and non-taxation than a tightening of thin capitalization rules.54 
5. Conclusion 
(1) Aggressive tax planning efforts of highly profitable multinational companies (so called 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)) have recently become the subject of intense 
public debate. As a response, several international initiatives and parties have called for 
more transparency in financial reporting, especially by means of a Country-by-Country 
Reporting (CbCR). 
(2) Existing provisions already require the disclosure of certain tax information, e.g. on tax 
payments in individual and consolidated financial accounts or transfer pricing 
documentation to tax authorities. Furthermore, some regulations requiring country-
specific information have been put in place for the extractive and financial sectors. 
However, no comprehensive CbCR for all countries and industry sectors has been 
implemented so far.  
(3) Several initiatives call for a comprehensive and public disclosure of specific information 
on tax payments and profits on a country-by-country basis. Our findings suggest that 
neither consolidated nor individual financial accounts seem to be an appropriate platform 
to provide such country-specific information. If at all, CbCR should be provided in a 
separate template. However, detailed and harmonized definitions and regulations would 
then have to be determined to ensure comparability. 
(4) The discussion on benefits and costs of a potential CbCR has revealed that benefits are 
largely uncertain since current tax planning activities are mainly based on the legal 
exploitation of gaps and loopholes in national and international tax law. Moreover, 
expected benefits are not based on a theoretical foundation. Costs, however, seem to be 
                                                     
54 See Blouin et al. (2013). 
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more significant. Therefore, CbCR cannot be regarded as a convincing measure to combat 
aggressive international tax planning of multinational companies. 
(5) Alternatively, the enforcement of national and international tax rules should be 
considered. This is in accordance with recent empirical evidence demonstrating, in 
particular, the effectiveness of tightening transfer pricing rules.  
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